Amor animi arbitrio sumitur, non ponitur
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Usually understood romantically: I choose to love, but I can’t choose to stop loving (I am a victim to my passions, at least in the second part of the phrase)
Could it rather be “The free mind chooses to promote love, not to reject it.”
i.e. promoting love and not rejecting it is the wise course (a “Hey Jude” kind of sentiment, but also quite Spinozan)
Note that there's no "but" in the Latin
Could it rather be “The free mind chooses to promote love, not to reject it.”
i.e. promoting love and not rejecting it is the wise course (a “Hey Jude” kind of sentiment, but also quite Spinozan)
Note that there's no "but" in the Latin
I don't agree with that at all. One by no means chooses to love, sentiments (love as well as other ones) are not things we choose, they just come like that.
Yes, not many would agree with the first part "we choose to love" when it's the straightforward sentimental reading.
But a more philosophical reading doesn't have that same problem, because it's not about the simple sentiments anymore.
Of course no-one says these "mottoes" are always correct.
There are some very stupid ones out there. "What doesn't kill you makes you stronger" is one that comes to mind.
Even the earlier one on this thread, "honestum non semper quod licet", is, as I said there, very debatable
But a more philosophical reading doesn't have that same problem, because it's not about the simple sentiments anymore.
Of course no-one says these "mottoes" are always correct.
There are some very stupid ones out there. "What doesn't kill you makes you stronger" is one that comes to mind.
Even the earlier one on this thread, "honestum non semper quod licet", is, as I said there, very debatable
What do you mean? What would be that more philosophical reading?
Agreed. And many are sometimes correct, sometimes not. It's rare for one short generalizing "philosophic" sentence of the kind to be true in all cases.
That one, I actually find it completely true; rather evident, even. It's not because something is permitted that it's a good thing.
The success of such a phrase depends on a certain degree of... resistance. No point in writing a book of sententiae that are self-evidently true. The fun of reading them is in working towards the sense in which you can agree with them. I couldn't say I absolutely agree with amor animi arbitrio sumitur, non ponitur, but I do find a sense in those words which is quite profound. I imagine the Romans were familiar with the idea of the sudden, involuntary onset of love (I think of Dido, Medea, Cupid's arrow): this phrase directly confronts it, challenges us to rethink that (conventional?) view. Perhaps we do, after all, make rapid calculations and assessments when we meet someone, to find such and such a person acceptable by a number of criteria. In sizing them up, there may come a point at which, pulse quickening, we realize that there is a real possibility, and we give ourselves permission to fall in love. And after that, there is no turning back.
A key feature of epigrams is that they be exaggerations and simplifications. "What doesn't kill you makes you stronger" is just an exaggeration of 'You learn from your mistakes'. It's often true; and given our aversion to making mistakes, and the pain we feel when we make them, it's a truth worth overstating. Which isn't to say that there aren't some people who are weakened by things that almost killed them; and some people who fall in love thoughtlessly, and fall out of love effortlessly.
A key feature of epigrams is that they be exaggerations and simplifications. "What doesn't kill you makes you stronger" is just an exaggeration of 'You learn from your mistakes'. It's often true; and given our aversion to making mistakes, and the pain we feel when we make them, it's a truth worth overstating. Which isn't to say that there aren't some people who are weakened by things that almost killed them; and some people who fall in love thoughtlessly, and fall out of love effortlessly.
The Latin word order puts the emphasis on sumitur and ponitur, not on arbitrio animi, so it would be that by the judgement of the mind we take up love, not put it down:
hence what I am calling the more philosophical reading, that it’s not a sentence about how love "happens", but rather about that the mind in its judgement (i.e. libre arbitre – free will – liberum arbitrium) would choose love, not reject love: i.e. it’s a fool who plays it cool by making his world a little colder OR the wise (i.e. freely thinking) person chooses love rather than hate (and knows, mind you, that love overcomes hate).
To epigrams having only partial application: yes indeed: in fact, one man’s sauce for the goose is another man’s poison for the gander!
hence what I am calling the more philosophical reading, that it’s not a sentence about how love "happens", but rather about that the mind in its judgement (i.e. libre arbitre – free will – liberum arbitrium) would choose love, not reject love: i.e. it’s a fool who plays it cool by making his world a little colder OR the wise (i.e. freely thinking) person chooses love rather than hate (and knows, mind you, that love overcomes hate).
To epigrams having only partial application: yes indeed: in fact, one man’s sauce for the goose is another man’s poison for the gander!
(I tried to edit this in, but got an error message)
On “honestum non semper quod licet”: it’s perhaps valid in real life (that countries will have bad laws (the problem here of course is that your list and mine won’t necessarily match)) but it’s based on a form of moral absolutism, which means that there are certain things which are always wrong. The first problem is how are you to know what they are? Almost everything has been justified by someone somewhere for some moral reason.
I’m not arguing against it (I still don’t have any fixed opinion on this one, but if anything tend toward the absolutist point-of-view) but I’m saying it is debatable (and has been debated for centuries) [indeed, it is one of the key debates of our present age].
I only brought up the topic because I thought the initial rendering and explanation of the phrase (scoundrels making laws for scoundrels) was far too flat.
On “honestum non semper quod licet”: it’s perhaps valid in real life (that countries will have bad laws (the problem here of course is that your list and mine won’t necessarily match)) but it’s based on a form of moral absolutism, which means that there are certain things which are always wrong. The first problem is how are you to know what they are? Almost everything has been justified by someone somewhere for some moral reason.
I’m not arguing against it (I still don’t have any fixed opinion on this one, but if anything tend toward the absolutist point-of-view) but I’m saying it is debatable (and has been debated for centuries) [indeed, it is one of the key debates of our present age].
I only brought up the topic because I thought the initial rendering and explanation of the phrase (scoundrels making laws for scoundrels) was far too flat.
I 'liked' your alternative interpretation of 'amor animi arbitrio...', because, well, I enjoy having my mind stretched a bit, and your version almost convinces me. But not quite. I can't quite accept that 'animi arbitrio' means effectively 'if you're wise'. Hmm, how to put my finger on the problem? Maybe it's that 'the mind's judgement' isn't per se a wise judgement, just a choice, an opinion. And it's relegated to an instrumental ablative in the middle of the sentence. That it is a 'wise' or 'good' choice would surely need to be explicitly and emphatically stated in the sentence: amorem sapiens sumit, non ponit?
It completely depends on how you understand "animi arbitrio". You could easily take it as opposed to "passione corporis" for example, and many philosophers have done, which would make it more than just a choice or opinion (or rather distinguishes between two types of "opinion") and does imply a freedom from outside "passional" influence, which does make it what we call rational or wise. [in later philosophy it should be "animae arbitrio" for my reading to be more watertight, but "animus" was also the rational soul, as opposed to the body.]
Aside from this, the problems faced by the other reading (even taking into account the fact that I may well judge a person "apt to be loved" on income/education/family whatever, I still can't choose to love them in the sentimental sense - "who marries for money earns it" would be a saying I like) lead me to think it may not be correct.
Aside from this, the problems faced by the other reading (even taking into account the fact that I may well judge a person "apt to be loved" on income/education/family whatever, I still can't choose to love them in the sentimental sense - "who marries for money earns it" would be a saying I like) lead me to think it may not be correct.
Again I am intrigued by your argument: and 'like' it again. I don't know the first thing about philosophy -- OK, maybe the first thing, but not the second or third thing -- so I would need to see your evidence for the opposition of 'animi arbitrio' to 'passione corporis'. I'm unsure whether we are talking about what Publilius Syrus might be likely to have meant, or what it is possible for the sentence to mean at all periods.
Regardless of my more personal, modern interpretation given above, I take it that the sentence was originally a version of the idea that love is easier to get into than out of. If you are saying that this interpretation is hard to believe, then my next job will be to convince you, by citation, that the idea was current in ancient world. I'll do that if you like. Off the top of my head, Ovid's mischievous version of the idea that a lover chooses: 'elige cui dicas Tu mihi sola places'. But I need better evidence than that, unless you already recognise the kind of thing I mean...
Regardless of my more personal, modern interpretation given above, I take it that the sentence was originally a version of the idea that love is easier to get into than out of. If you are saying that this interpretation is hard to believe, then my next job will be to convince you, by citation, that the idea was current in ancient world. I'll do that if you like. Off the top of my head, Ovid's mischievous version of the idea that a lover chooses: 'elige cui dicas Tu mihi sola places'. But I need better evidence than that, unless you already recognise the kind of thing I mean...
Seemingly the Publius Syrus line may well have been a quote from a play, so who knows what was going on, but I’m talking about how one might understand the phrase in general – what useful meaning one might take from it. My point is that it could be read as saying that the mind/soul will (as a rule) take up love rather than rejecting it. The body may well reject (or not be interested in) love (not just sexual desire – which is what the other reading may well be equating love with) because it is only interested in physical desires. [I’m not claiming this as my philosophy (who am I to knock physical desire?), just as a more interesting reading of the phrase. See Spinoza note below for a meshing of all this ancient disunity].
For the distinction between body and soul: here are some quotes from the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, all of which go directly to the issue here. Then a little addendum of my own.
Porphyry
Through the body and its non-rational soul (the seat of appetitive and spirited desires and sense-perception) they [people] belong to the sensible realm, through their higher soul (intellect) to the intelligible. Actually, the true human being is to be identified with the intellect and the intelligible Man. It follows from this that the task set for human beings is to free themselves from the sensible and live by the intelligible, which after all is their true or real nature.
...
As noted above, Porphyry distinguishes between the rational (higher) soul and the non-rational (lower) soul. The lower soul is presumably identical with this second power that originates in the soul's inclination toward the body. The higher soul is the same as reason, whereas the lower is responsible for soul-functions that directly involve the body, such as perception and desire. In the tradition before him, this distinction sometimes became so sharp that it was supposed that each person has two distinct souls.
...
For Porphyry, as for Plotinus, what matters most in life is to free one's soul from the calamities of the body and the sensible world in general so that it may become purely what it originally and essentially is, viz., a part of the intelligible world.
...
Thus, e.g., wisdom as a purgative virtue is defined as the soul's “not forming opinions in accordance with the body, but acting on its own”, whereas wisdom as a contemplative virtue consists in the contemplation of the essences inherent in the Intellect.
Plotinus
The drama of human life is viewed by Plotinus against the axis of Good and evil outlined above. The human person is essentially a soul employing a body as an instrument of its temporary embodied life (see I 1). Thus, Plotinus distinguishes between the person and the composite of soul and body. That person is identical with a cognitive agent or subject of cognitive states (see I 1. 7). An embodied person is, therefore, a conflicted entity, capable both of thought and of being the subject of the composite's non-cognitive states, such as appetites and emotions.
...
A person in a body can choose to take on the role of a non-cognitive agent by acting solely on appetite or emotion. In doing so, that person manifests a corrupted desire, a desire for what is evil, the material aspect of the bodily. Alternatively, a person can distance himself from these desires and identify himself with his rational self.
Ancient theories of soul
The soul of the Phaedo [Plato] in fact seems to be precisely what in Republic 4 is identified as just one part of the soul, namely reason, whereas the functions of the lower parts, appetite and spirit, are assigned, in the psychological framework of the Phaedo, to the animate body. And just as the functions of reason (in the Republic) and of the soul (in the Phaedo) are not restricted to cognition, but include desire and emotion, such as desire for and pleasure in learning, so the functions of non-rational soul (in the Republic) and of the body (in the Phaedo) are not restricted to desire and emotion, but include cognition, such as beliefs (presumably) about objects of desire, ‘descriptive’ or (rather) non-evaluative (“there's food over there”) as well as evaluative (“this drink is delightful”) (cf. Phaedo 83d).
...
The range of activities (etc.) that the soul is directly responsible for, and which may be described as activities of the soul strictly speaking, is significantly narrower than the range of mental activities. It does not include all of a person's desires, nor need it include all emotional responses, or even all beliefs. One plainly could not have (for instance) ‘bodily’ desires such as hunger and thirst without being ensouled, but that does not mean that it must be the soul itself that forms or sustains such desires.
Love
Such an understanding of eros is encouraged by Plato's discussion in the Symposium, in which Socrates understands sexual desire to be a deficient response to physical beauty in particular, a response which ought to be developed into a response to the beauty of a person's soul and, ultimately, into a response to the form, Beauty.
[Spinoza much later tries to solve the confusion by making soul and body one thing, but calls the soul/body active when acting on its own promptings and passive when “acting” on the promptings of external forces (he doesn’t talk about arbitrio animae/animus, but could do, to mean the action of the soul/body, which would be, by Spinoza’s lights, to accept (non-only-physical) love, because love will make the soul/body stronger and so even more able to act.)]
For the distinction between body and soul: here are some quotes from the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, all of which go directly to the issue here. Then a little addendum of my own.
Porphyry
Through the body and its non-rational soul (the seat of appetitive and spirited desires and sense-perception) they [people] belong to the sensible realm, through their higher soul (intellect) to the intelligible. Actually, the true human being is to be identified with the intellect and the intelligible Man. It follows from this that the task set for human beings is to free themselves from the sensible and live by the intelligible, which after all is their true or real nature.
...
As noted above, Porphyry distinguishes between the rational (higher) soul and the non-rational (lower) soul. The lower soul is presumably identical with this second power that originates in the soul's inclination toward the body. The higher soul is the same as reason, whereas the lower is responsible for soul-functions that directly involve the body, such as perception and desire. In the tradition before him, this distinction sometimes became so sharp that it was supposed that each person has two distinct souls.
...
For Porphyry, as for Plotinus, what matters most in life is to free one's soul from the calamities of the body and the sensible world in general so that it may become purely what it originally and essentially is, viz., a part of the intelligible world.
...
Thus, e.g., wisdom as a purgative virtue is defined as the soul's “not forming opinions in accordance with the body, but acting on its own”, whereas wisdom as a contemplative virtue consists in the contemplation of the essences inherent in the Intellect.
Plotinus
The drama of human life is viewed by Plotinus against the axis of Good and evil outlined above. The human person is essentially a soul employing a body as an instrument of its temporary embodied life (see I 1). Thus, Plotinus distinguishes between the person and the composite of soul and body. That person is identical with a cognitive agent or subject of cognitive states (see I 1. 7). An embodied person is, therefore, a conflicted entity, capable both of thought and of being the subject of the composite's non-cognitive states, such as appetites and emotions.
...
A person in a body can choose to take on the role of a non-cognitive agent by acting solely on appetite or emotion. In doing so, that person manifests a corrupted desire, a desire for what is evil, the material aspect of the bodily. Alternatively, a person can distance himself from these desires and identify himself with his rational self.
Ancient theories of soul
The soul of the Phaedo [Plato] in fact seems to be precisely what in Republic 4 is identified as just one part of the soul, namely reason, whereas the functions of the lower parts, appetite and spirit, are assigned, in the psychological framework of the Phaedo, to the animate body. And just as the functions of reason (in the Republic) and of the soul (in the Phaedo) are not restricted to cognition, but include desire and emotion, such as desire for and pleasure in learning, so the functions of non-rational soul (in the Republic) and of the body (in the Phaedo) are not restricted to desire and emotion, but include cognition, such as beliefs (presumably) about objects of desire, ‘descriptive’ or (rather) non-evaluative (“there's food over there”) as well as evaluative (“this drink is delightful”) (cf. Phaedo 83d).
...
The range of activities (etc.) that the soul is directly responsible for, and which may be described as activities of the soul strictly speaking, is significantly narrower than the range of mental activities. It does not include all of a person's desires, nor need it include all emotional responses, or even all beliefs. One plainly could not have (for instance) ‘bodily’ desires such as hunger and thirst without being ensouled, but that does not mean that it must be the soul itself that forms or sustains such desires.
Love
Such an understanding of eros is encouraged by Plato's discussion in the Symposium, in which Socrates understands sexual desire to be a deficient response to physical beauty in particular, a response which ought to be developed into a response to the beauty of a person's soul and, ultimately, into a response to the form, Beauty.
[Spinoza much later tries to solve the confusion by making soul and body one thing, but calls the soul/body active when acting on its own promptings and passive when “acting” on the promptings of external forces (he doesn’t talk about arbitrio animae/animus, but could do, to mean the action of the soul/body, which would be, by Spinoza’s lights, to accept (non-only-physical) love, because love will make the soul/body stronger and so even more able to act.)]
I can't give this the reply it deserves -- I'm a bit pressed for time. You do show that some kind of mind/body split is available in classical culture, which is a partial answer to the question. But the question as I put it was more a linguistic one: do we find in the existing literature the phrase 'arbitrium animi' paired with and contrasted with some other motive force such as 'animal instinct' or 'inclination of body'. I appreciate that the phrase you offered, 'passione corporis', was only exempli gratia; but I still need to be convinced that 'arbitrium animi' -- or frankly 'arbitrium' on its own -- stands for rationality, intelligence, wisdom, as opposed to something like bodily appetite, or thoughtlessness, or irrationality. You may find such evidence: but until you do, I can't quite buy 'arbitrium' as a synonym for 'ratio'.
I think you give up too quickly. Yes, it's possible that this is extracted from a play, either someone else's or Publilius' own. Even if so, in extracting it, he must have felt that it had a meaning outside of its dramatic context. The playwright might have written the line precisely as a quotable, extractable senitiment. And it may not be a quote, but an epigram manufactured for the collection. Publilius comes from the 1st C B.C., so these epigrams are drawn from a world with which we are very familiar, so there is a good chance that the epigram in question will be only one expression an idea that we can parallel elsewhere. You didn't take the bait last time, so I guess I'll have to start looking around to find some better parallels.
That's fine; but opening up the historical timescale makes it something we can't usefully debate. You can offer me your feeling, I can offer you mine. We both have, in fact. We could have a very interesting debate about whether love is entered into by choice; or we could have another interesting debate about whether a rational person should start, but not stop, loving (if that is your point -- I find yours as difficult as you, apparently, find mine). But if we do so, we have to abandon the idea that we're interpreting Publilius's phrase.
It is interesting to be pushed to justify a reading, and I admit that viz. Publius himself I can’t.
I’m relying on the time-worn phrase of “liberum arbitrium” (free will) to back my reading. And I think it is hardly a major step to say that “animae arbitrio” (or “animi arbitrio”) can mean the same thing (even without the explicit “liberum” since what is “liberum arbitium” if not “arbitrium” per se?). And then I am stepping from there to say that this will imply what we call reason (indeed Medieval Aristotelians spoke of the will as “rational appetite”).
Look at the quote on Plotinus:
“A person in a body can choose to take on the role of a non-cognitive agent by acting solely on appetite or emotion. In doing so, that person manifests a corrupted desire, a desire for what is evil, the material aspect of the bodily. Alternatively, a person can distance himself from these desires and identify himself with his rational self.”
Here are a couple of uses just of “animae arbitrio” I googled up that seem to go to the issue
http://www.augustinus.it/latino/incompiuta_giuliano/incompiuta_giuliano_6.htm
Ambrosius, qui cum dixisset carnem moderatioris animae arbitrio coniugandam ...
This text is interesting in that it mostly talks about “libero arbitrio/liberum arbitrium”, but a few times uses “arbitrio/um” alone and seems (looking at it quickly enough I admit – I must actually have a proper read of Latin Augustine) to use it to mean the same. It’s often used with “voluntatis”. (Or it speaks of “arbitrii negotium”)
I know Augustine’s is a Christian text, (with the arbitium being helped by the grace of God and whatnot) but I don’t think it outlandish to say that the understanding of “arbitium” can cross over. I’d have to try to really trace the use of arbitrium, which is what you’re asking me to do: a post-doc project maybe – probably not even acceptable as one, since too big.
Here’s an interesting medical text (though alot later) that equates “animae arbitrio” with “imperio voluntatis”: the sphincter opening and closing “sponte sua, absque animae arbitrio”
http://books.google.ie/books?id=fBpETt-oegsC&pg=PA154&lpg=PA154&dq="animae+arbitrio"&source=bl&ots=Epell4kM43&sig=iYN3m2Dt203EAoNnHG-OfwLBLqY&hl=en&sa=X&ei=HyLxUcKAKsGq7Qaj44GAAQ&ved=0CCoQ6AEwADgK#v=onepage&q="animae arbitrio"&f=false
[How does one do the short links?]
And another medical one.
Cor enim , quod , licet vi magna , tamen iieruis exguis gaudet, quos et ipfos renlorios folummodo efle puto , liberum prorfus ab omni animae arbitrio eft, quae neque excitare, neque interrumpere, neque vllo modo validos eius motus mutare vel detcrminare poteft.
http://archive.org/stream/novicommentariac15impe/novicommentariac15impe_djvu.txt
I don’t understand all of this one, since I’m not all that clear on all the letters (iieruis?, renlorios? Anybody?) but it does seem that the heart is not subject to the will of the mind.
If there are parallels for the term/idea in other texts of the period, great, and if they support the banal reading, that’s just too bad. I don’t have any trouble understanding the other reading of the Publius line; I just don’t like it much.
I was going to write about thoughts contra the zeitgeist and so really amenable to confirmation from other uses of terms – Wilde, Socrates, Spinoza – but I’ll let it alone.
I’ll stop. Thanks again for pushing me to justify the reading I like, and apologies for not being better able.
I’m relying on the time-worn phrase of “liberum arbitrium” (free will) to back my reading. And I think it is hardly a major step to say that “animae arbitrio” (or “animi arbitrio”) can mean the same thing (even without the explicit “liberum” since what is “liberum arbitium” if not “arbitrium” per se?). And then I am stepping from there to say that this will imply what we call reason (indeed Medieval Aristotelians spoke of the will as “rational appetite”).
Look at the quote on Plotinus:
“A person in a body can choose to take on the role of a non-cognitive agent by acting solely on appetite or emotion. In doing so, that person manifests a corrupted desire, a desire for what is evil, the material aspect of the bodily. Alternatively, a person can distance himself from these desires and identify himself with his rational self.”
Here are a couple of uses just of “animae arbitrio” I googled up that seem to go to the issue
http://www.augustinus.it/latino/incompiuta_giuliano/incompiuta_giuliano_6.htm
Ambrosius, qui cum dixisset carnem moderatioris animae arbitrio coniugandam ...
This text is interesting in that it mostly talks about “libero arbitrio/liberum arbitrium”, but a few times uses “arbitrio/um” alone and seems (looking at it quickly enough I admit – I must actually have a proper read of Latin Augustine) to use it to mean the same. It’s often used with “voluntatis”. (Or it speaks of “arbitrii negotium”)
I know Augustine’s is a Christian text, (with the arbitium being helped by the grace of God and whatnot) but I don’t think it outlandish to say that the understanding of “arbitium” can cross over. I’d have to try to really trace the use of arbitrium, which is what you’re asking me to do: a post-doc project maybe – probably not even acceptable as one, since too big.
Here’s an interesting medical text (though alot later) that equates “animae arbitrio” with “imperio voluntatis”: the sphincter opening and closing “sponte sua, absque animae arbitrio”
http://books.google.ie/books?id=fBpETt-oegsC&pg=PA154&lpg=PA154&dq="animae+arbitrio"&source=bl&ots=Epell4kM43&sig=iYN3m2Dt203EAoNnHG-OfwLBLqY&hl=en&sa=X&ei=HyLxUcKAKsGq7Qaj44GAAQ&ved=0CCoQ6AEwADgK#v=onepage&q="animae arbitrio"&f=false
[How does one do the short links?]
And another medical one.
Cor enim , quod , licet vi magna , tamen iieruis exguis gaudet, quos et ipfos renlorios folummodo efle puto , liberum prorfus ab omni animae arbitrio eft, quae neque excitare, neque interrumpere, neque vllo modo validos eius motus mutare vel detcrminare poteft.
http://archive.org/stream/novicommentariac15impe/novicommentariac15impe_djvu.txt
I don’t understand all of this one, since I’m not all that clear on all the letters (iieruis?, renlorios? Anybody?) but it does seem that the heart is not subject to the will of the mind.
If there are parallels for the term/idea in other texts of the period, great, and if they support the banal reading, that’s just too bad. I don’t have any trouble understanding the other reading of the Publius line; I just don’t like it much.
I was going to write about thoughts contra the zeitgeist and so really amenable to confirmation from other uses of terms – Wilde, Socrates, Spinoza – but I’ll let it alone.
I’ll stop. Thanks again for pushing me to justify the reading I like, and apologies for not being better able.
Select the word you want to insert the link in; the little link icon - sixth icon from the right on the bottom line of icons - will light up; click it and a box will appear; copy and past your link in it.
Iieruis, I'd say nervis. The other one I don't know.
As for the liberum arbitrium, I think it's an illusion. Even when we choose, do we choose to choose? We choose because of things happening in our brains, neuron connections or whatever, which are determined by physical factors as well as external factors acting on them. We don't choose our character, it has been formed by a mix of genetical factors and experiences we've lived since we were born. And our character leads us to act in such or such a way, to choose this and that. I don't think we're free in reality, and in a way the good guy has no merit and the bad guy, it's not his fault.
I'm putting in a link here, not because it's a great article, but just because (thank you!!) I can!!!! Spinoza link.
And also to say that I agree with the idea of free will as an illusion, But this is a whole other debate. And one can still use the term while knowing that you mean something else entirely from the usual sense of transcendant freedom to choose [see my note above on surrounding linguistic context as not always a sure guide to meaning of a term in a given text].
I am in fact suggesting that the Publius line can be understood as referring to free will, but not in this transcendent sense, but in the Spinozan - and I suggest (though hesitantly, and I must look into it) Porphyryan and Plotinian - sense of following your own force, rather than following an external force - though your own force (the "rational" self) is itself ultimately unfree.
Now, on that other debate:
I point to Spinoza as one of the more famous propounders of the anti-free-will theory (and I quite agree with him) though he wasn't as materialist about it as you are, PP. For him, mind and body are the same thing, so to talk about body ruling mind didn't mean anything.
Spinoza was rather an anti-free-willer out of causal-necessitarian grounds - there are causes going on of which we are unaware and which make it impossible for us to do otherwise than we do: Having been raised as I was, and having been given by nature the qualities I have, and then having met the influences I did, I could not have been otherwise than a criminal, or a saint - and yes, no merit or blame!
The question then is why should one be punished for "ill" behaviour? ( The " " are because there won't be any real good or bad, since who is to set the standard? [This goes to another discussion we were having, PP, somewhere, but I forget where now - 10 mins later - I remember: "Honestum non semper quod licet"]) The answer from Spinoza is that the behaviour itself is the suffering, and that you do suffer for your stupidity even though it's not really your fault, like the man bitten by the dog suffers. [This means that if you are wise you accept whatever happens, so by accepting your suffering you actually suffer less, because you are less stupid!.]
All you have to worry about is what will bring you most happiness/power [I know this sounds very egocentric at first - and alot of people never see past this element of Spinoza, and so completely miss the point] and what you want is understanding, and the fact is that you need other people to help you to understand. So I what I most want (all I want, in fact) when I am being reasonable - i.e. following my own dictates and not those of someone else (even though in fact I have no choice as to whether to do this or not! if the external force is stronger than me, there is nothing I can do to prevent it overpowering me; this also I must accept) - is that you understand the reality of the universe, and thereby help me to do so. [This striving to understand is the only good and bad, and we must remember that it is only from our point of view, and were the human race (or all the Earth, or whatever) to be wiped out, it would ultimately be neither good nor bad].
By the way:
RENLORIOS = SENSORIOS
And also to say that I agree with the idea of free will as an illusion, But this is a whole other debate. And one can still use the term while knowing that you mean something else entirely from the usual sense of transcendant freedom to choose [see my note above on surrounding linguistic context as not always a sure guide to meaning of a term in a given text].
I am in fact suggesting that the Publius line can be understood as referring to free will, but not in this transcendent sense, but in the Spinozan - and I suggest (though hesitantly, and I must look into it) Porphyryan and Plotinian - sense of following your own force, rather than following an external force - though your own force (the "rational" self) is itself ultimately unfree.
Now, on that other debate:
I point to Spinoza as one of the more famous propounders of the anti-free-will theory (and I quite agree with him) though he wasn't as materialist about it as you are, PP. For him, mind and body are the same thing, so to talk about body ruling mind didn't mean anything.
Spinoza was rather an anti-free-willer out of causal-necessitarian grounds - there are causes going on of which we are unaware and which make it impossible for us to do otherwise than we do: Having been raised as I was, and having been given by nature the qualities I have, and then having met the influences I did, I could not have been otherwise than a criminal, or a saint - and yes, no merit or blame!
The question then is why should one be punished for "ill" behaviour? ( The " " are because there won't be any real good or bad, since who is to set the standard? [This goes to another discussion we were having, PP, somewhere, but I forget where now - 10 mins later - I remember: "Honestum non semper quod licet"]) The answer from Spinoza is that the behaviour itself is the suffering, and that you do suffer for your stupidity even though it's not really your fault, like the man bitten by the dog suffers. [This means that if you are wise you accept whatever happens, so by accepting your suffering you actually suffer less, because you are less stupid!.]
All you have to worry about is what will bring you most happiness/power [I know this sounds very egocentric at first - and alot of people never see past this element of Spinoza, and so completely miss the point] and what you want is understanding, and the fact is that you need other people to help you to understand. So I what I most want (all I want, in fact) when I am being reasonable - i.e. following my own dictates and not those of someone else (even though in fact I have no choice as to whether to do this or not! if the external force is stronger than me, there is nothing I can do to prevent it overpowering me; this also I must accept) - is that you understand the reality of the universe, and thereby help me to do so. [This striving to understand is the only good and bad, and we must remember that it is only from our point of view, and were the human race (or all the Earth, or whatever) to be wiped out, it would ultimately be neither good nor bad].
By the way:
RENLORIOS = SENSORIOS
Yes I know it wans't exactly the theme of your debate with Socratidion - it's just the mention of liberum arbitrium that made me feel like commenting on it.
From what you explain of Spinoza, I share his views on the whole.
Now about honestum non semper quod licet: of course, it's undeniable that everyone doesn't have the same notion of "good" and "bad". But everyone has a certain notion of it... Even if we imagine someone who finds bad only what's bad to himself and good only what's profitable to himself. We do suffer from certain things or certain acts of others (or ourselves), and we know some things can harm others, and for me these are the only "bad" things. So I'd say that even though "good" and "bad" are not the same in everyone's mind, they nonetheless exist, since we all feel them one way or another. And some things that are permitted can do harm to someone or another, so they can be "bad"... Even if there's no straightforward "classification" of "good" and "bad".